ventured to describe a question set by Mr. Mahaffy, at Trinity Colle:":c, Dublin, as "very oddly worded." I might have said v . ':V ;mpio'cr!v worded, and have justified the sentence; but for th e fact tbat it wa, the Cambridge examination-papers only that were the s,,bjcct o[ my criticism in that work. My boldness in this censure on !\Ir. '.vlahaffy has occasioned remark. That gentleman is confessedly a capital metaphysician, perhaps of greater power than the learned professor whose work he transbtecl and annotated. I therefore ask for space in NATURE to assign the reasons on which I asserted that his question was" very oddly worded." Here is the que,;tion: "Explain the statement th at his [Kant's] doctrine of Space and Time is based on a trauscmdmtal distinction." I think I cannot be in error in taking this as a reference to the .f(ritik dcr 1·ei1te1t Vinzu11fl, Transac . .tEsth. § 8, At<gc111ci11e Ammrlamgm, &c., and in particubr to the paragmph beginning "Die Leibnitz-\Volfj'sche Philosophie," &c., and that which imm ed iately follows. Iii the former, and indeed in its immediate precursor, Kant is impugning the view that affection and function (Sense and Intellect) have only a logical difference, as if Sense were only differenced from ll nderstanding by the inferiority of its representations, in precision and clearness. The latter paragraph (the third of those I have referred to) beginning "Wir unterschieden sonst wohl unter Erscheinungen das," &c., may be thus rendered:-" vVe otherwise draw a proper distinction, in phenomena, hetween that which is an essential property of the intuition of it, and is generally valicl for every one's sense, on the one hand ; and on the other, that which belongs to it accidentally, inasmuch as it is not valid for the faculty of general sensibility, but only for a particular state or organisation of this or that sense."
This, Kant names an empirical distinction. To it he opposes what he calls a transcendental distinction, viz., that between ph enomena and things in themselves, or whal is involved therein, that bet1veen affection and function. As Kant points out, if we do not make the distinction between affection and function, we cannot explain the transcendental constituents of a phenomenon, and thereby we take it for a thing in itself, i.e., a reality existing ind ependently of our perception of it ; and we so Jose the distin ction between the phenomenon and the thing in itself, of which latter we know nothing whatever. Now, Mr. Mahaffy's question concerns a certain statement. ·whose? Well, probably, it is his own, viz., that which occurs in a footnote to p. <;7 of his translation of Fischer's Commentary on Kant's C. p. R. Mr. Mahaffy here says, "We must not confuse the empirical distinction between real object and merely subjective appearance with the tmnscmdmtal distinction upon which his (Kant's) doctrine of space and time is based." This l believe to be the topic referred to in the question. It is manifestly open to two objections. Each of the terms "real object," and "merely subjective appearance" is equivocal. "Real object" may be the phenomenal object or the noumenal object, "Merely subjective appearance" may be what Kant calls "blos,/ Erscheinung " or the impression which the object makes on the particular sense cf this or that subject. The actual terms used by Mr. Mahaffy more properly import the distinction between the thing in itsel f and its phenomenon; yet it is plain he means to follow Kant, and to speak of the distinction between phenomenal object, and particular subjective impression. It is the other matter of the extract with which the question deals ; and it is this which I have no hesitation in pronouncing a very improper and misleading statement. Kant's doctrine of Space and Time is not based on this distinction. On the contrary, the distinction is an outcome of that doctrine, and does not, cannot, emerge till that doctrine is established. The fruit of the doctrine cannot be its root ; nor can that which is the basis of the distinction be itself based on that distinction. The truth is, that Kant's doctrine of Space and Time is one that concerns Sense only; it is .tEsthetic ; and as discovering the a priori sense-elements of experience, it is called Transcendental.tEsthetic. Accordingly it touches but one pole of the distinction, and only so far helps it out ! How can such a doctrine be properly said to be based on a distinction between the two pol es ? The very notion is preposterous, and derives, of coun;e, no countenance whatever from the Critic if pure Reason.
The extremely curt and concise manner in which I have dealt with the actual subjects of examination in my book was essential to its brevity and corresponding lowness of price. The above remarks will show how insecure will be any inference of the poverty of my reasons from the paucity of my words.
llford, E., Aug. 1 C. M. INGLEBY Spontaneous Generation IF there is one thing more curious than another in the "Spontan eous Generation" theory, it is the way in which socalled matters of fact, as proved by careful experiment, are brought forward by the one side to be disproved by the other ; one need only instance Pasteur's famous flask experiments, which were thought to be so overwhelming at the time, but which were afterwards refuted, I think by Fremy and others.
I notice with surprise the letters of Prof. Wanklyn and Dr. Lionel Beale in NATURE, with regard to the presence of germs in the air; there is an experiment of Pasteur's, given in his "Memoirs upon the organised Corpuscles which exist in the Atmosphere, 1862," and ,vhich I have never seen disproved, and if not disproved it must surely settle at ]east this part of the question . He passed a quantity of air, taking various precautions to eliminate error, which I need not here detail, by means of an aspirator through a plug of gun-cotton; he then dissolved the gun-cotton in ether, and on examining the sediment which subsided in the course of an hour or two, he found abundant evidence of the presence of organised corpuscles.
Bath CHARLES EKIN
Mirage
I HAVE just returned to England from H.M.S. Porcupine, having accompanied the dredgmg expedition as far as Lisbon.
In reading the back numbers of NATURE, I notice in that for July 28 an account of an extraordinary mirage in the Firth of Forth on July 22. A reference to my journal shows me that on the same day we were dredging on the Portuguese coast, within siglit of the Ferilhoe and Ber!inga Islands, about forty miles north of Lisbon. The bearings of these islands and their exact distance, calculated by the aid of the known height of the lighthouse, gave us, of course, an exact position, which our "dead reckoning" also confirmed. Several solar observations, both for latitude and longitude, were taken by two of the officers during the day, both of whom always arrived at the same result, but this was so widely different from our position as previously determined by two other methods, that we were forced to the conclusion that there was a very false horizou. It was the only instance of the kind during the month I was at sea. Clifton, Aug. 8 WM. LANT CARPENTER The Sun's Corona IF "my mathematical result was based upon data among which the principal point at issue was accepted as proved," it will be easy for you to state what that point is,* and to quote one passage at least in which Mr. Lockyer has associated it with his theory. In this way alone can you justify the assertion in your last editorial note.
So much you are bound in common justice to do. But further, it would be satisfactory if a distinct statement of Mr. Lockyer's * A possible action at the moon's limb suggested Ly Faye, Gould a11d
others.-Eo.
